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THE INTERNAL RELATIONS OF
GOVERNMENT: CAUTIONARY TALES
FROM INSIDE THE BLACK BOX
PETER L. STRAUSS*
I
INTRODUCTION
Both the structure of the Constitution and elementary civics texts imagine
an Executive Branch under the close, unitary control of an elected chief execu-
tive, the President.  Doubtless from the start, and unmistakably in the adminis-
trative state, the reality has been quite different.  Those to whom Congress has
delegated authority to act, particularly in that domain that we have in mind
when invoking a “government of laws,”1 conduct their business within a web
more aptly described as coordination than control.2  In regulatory matters, the
coordinating impulses run through the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and, in-
creasingly, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) of the
presidential Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”).  Perhaps as strongly,
coordination may result from the regulators and their lawyers understanding
themselves to be part of a single government.  Yet, both within the DOJ and
within any given agency, distortions of perspective that are the product of an
actor’s task, or perhaps even personal ambition, can complicate its achieve-
ment.  And institutions for forcing consideration of broader, more inclusive vi-
sions are few.
What follows is an effort to explore some of these problems, drawing on
personal experience as a government attorney often faced by what seemed fail-
ures or distortions in attempted coordination.  From 1975 to 1977, I was privi-
leged to serve as General Counsel to the spanking new United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”).  The NRC was an independent regulatory
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1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).  Excluded from this account are func-
tions like foreign relations and national security, where, in Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “the heads
of departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute [his] will . . .
[so that] nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.”  Id.
at 166.
2. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 660-67 (1984).
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commission created out of one rib of the Atomic Energy Commission.3  Its very
newness and the special character of its responsibilities created opportunities to
consider the legal relations within executive4 government that remain timely
sources of concern two decades later.  Three vignettes, all involving relations
with government attorneys in other offices, will suggest some dimensions of the
problem.
A.  What Does It Mean to Be a Client?
Brookhaven National Laboratory has a nuclear reactor that generates ra-
dioactive waste fuel.  As Brookhaven is located on Long Island, in New York
state, virtually all routes for moving that waste, whether by land or water, lead
naturally through New York City, and for years it had shipped its waste out
through the city.  Through a newly adopted ordinance pursuant to its Health
Code, New York City sought to bar any transshipment of radioactive waste
through the city as a health hazard to its citizens.  That prohibition raised pre-
emption questions in a rather complex legal framework.
At about the same time as the NRC was created, enactment of the Hazard-
ous Materials Transportation Act5 made the Department of Transportation the
national regulator of hazardous materials transportation.  The Act authorized
the Department to adopt rules governing transportation of this material, rules
that would ordinarily preempt conflicting rules of states and localities.6  Where
conflicts occurred, the Act gave states and localities an opportunity, through an
administrative proceeding, to persuade the Secretary that their adoption of
more stringent regulations imposed no excessive burden on interstate com-
merce.7  The Department had not yet adopted any rules, and perforce New
York City had not invoked these new and unexplored administrative proce-
dures.  In the meantime, the City’s rules not only blocked interstate commerce
but also threatened a national laboratory; thus, conventional constitutional
analysis suggested the possibility of direct judicial relief.  At the same time, one
can imagine the general political concerns this new measure fueled, generating
public and political support for the city’s objections to the passage of radioac-
                                                          
3. The Atomic Energy Commission was another “independent” body, but one whose responsi-
bility for developing nuclear weaponry as well as the peaceful uses of atomic energy produced strong
ties to the Executive Branch, ties acknowledged in transferring those aspects of its responsibilities to a
cabinet department, the Department of Energy.
4. As the following pages will make clear, whether the NRC was “in” the Executive Branch was,
itself, an open question.  The concept of the “independent regulatory commissions” is sometimes pre-
sented as if the answer to that question could be negative.  No one could doubt, however, that what it
did was no more or less than what undoubtedly executive branch agencies do on a daily basis.  My own
judgment, see Strauss, supra note 2, is that the independent regulatory commissions must be regarded
as being in the Executive Branch for constitutional purposes, albeit under a more restricted set of rela-
tionships with the President than cabinet agencies enjoy.  Be that as it may, wherever they “are,” their
function is best described as “executive.”
5. Pub. L. No. 93-633, Title I, § 102, 88 Stat. 2156, supplanted in 1994 by Pub. L. No. 103-272, 108
Stat. 1379, (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1527 (1994)).
6. See 49 U.S.C. § 5103 (1994).
7. See 49 U.S.C. § 5125 (1994).
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tivity-laden trucks through its streets.  And, in the world of federal regulation,
the Department had some interest in effecting its new authority.
Whether at Brookhaven’s instigation or in some other way memory does
not recall, the possibility of initiating litigation to declare New York City’s new
ordinance unconstitutional wound up in the hands of a young attorney in the
office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York.  It quickly
became apparent that he would decide whether we would go immediately to
court or wait for the Department of Transportation first to adopt a rule (which
might or might not permit continued road carriage of spent nuclear fuel
through a large metropolis) and then to assess the city’s special circumstances.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, even the
Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice, would certainly
be consulted; but the decision would be taken in the young attorney’s office.
That is, national transportation policy was being made, not by the agencies
concerned, but by an assistant U.S. Attorney.  Perhaps unsurprisingly for a
young attorney with a reputation to make, the decision was to sue at once, and,
not much more surprisingly, the government lost.8
B.  What Kind of Relationship Do We Have with the President?
The NRC’s Commissioners were perhaps understandably ambivalent about
the meaning of their “independent” status.  In contexts with foreign relations
sensitivity—notably, licensing nuclear fuel for export—they did not think they
could simply accept at face value the diplomatic and security assessments of the
State Department and the CIA.  Rather, they thought, their “independence”
required of them some form of independent review.  On the other hand, they
welcomed presidential interest in their actions and had no doubt that they
should deal with him as “team players;” they volunteered participation in OMB
consultative activities and generally waited for a response from OMB before
acting on any matter on which it might have a view.  In one such case, OMB
routinely forwarded to the NRC for comment proposed legislation for regulat-
ing the use of executive privilege.  The bill provided standards for its exercise
and required that it be exercised personally by the President; it also limited the
reach of executive privilege to the Executive Branch, narrowly construed.  If
enacted, the bill would foreclose a Commission claim of executive privilege in
relation to either confidential State Department documents in its files or, for
that matter, security plans for nuclear power plants or materials describing nu-
clear weapons technology the files might contain.  The Commission sent back
comments, pointing out that if the bill were to be enacted, it would be impera-
tive to amend it to include the NRC in its scope.  That issue was put before the
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel, which responded that the
NRC was simply wrong.  As an independent regulatory commission, the NRC
                                                          
8. The litigation continued well into the 1980s; the final chapter appears to have been written in
City of New York v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 700 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), which well de-
scribes the earlier stages.
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could not expect to have the protection of executive privilege even with regard
to informational demands that demonstrably threatened national security.  The
position the NRC urged would not be taken.
C.  The Litigation Tail and the Policy Dog
The litigation that would become Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,9 had been briefed by lawyers for the
Atomic Energy Commission in the months before the NRC’s founding, and ar-
gued in the D.C. Circuit in the spring of 1975.  The litigation grabbed the
Commission’s attention on July 21, 1976, fourteen months later, when the D.C.
Circuit announced an opinion that threatened to suspend all licensing of nu-
clear power plants pending the Commission’s reconsideration of an important,
complex, and highly contentious rulemaking.10  Responding to that opinion
posed a number of interesting challenges, from whether to call the court’s at-
tention to striking errors in reading the record whose correction might weaken
the case for Supreme Court review, to how it might be possible for the Com-
mission to continue to license nuclear power plants in the interim before Su-
preme Court action or the generation of a new rule.
Prominent among these challenges were the Commission’s discussions with
the Solicitor General’s office about the filing of a petition for the writ of certio-
rari.  The D.C. Circuit’s opinion was perhaps intentionally murky, but the
Commission understood its general drift to require extensive use of oral proce-
dures in any renewed rulemaking on remand.  The appropriateness of this in-
terpretation was reinforced by the opinion’s authorship:  Chief Judge David L.
Bazelon’s general preference for procedural elaboration in scientifically con-
tentious rulemakings was well-established and recently had been forcefully
voiced.11  So, as it prepared for a proceeding that would deploy the expensive
procedures it understood the D.C. Circuit to have required, the Commission
sought the Solicitor General’s support for the position—ultimately vindicated
beyond fondest hope—that that court had no business doing so.  The process
began with the inevitable memoranda and eventually led to a lengthy afternoon
meeting at the Justice Department.  The Solicitor General agreed that court-
imposed procedural requirements for informal rulemaking would have been
both unlawful and sufficiently important to support a government petition for
certiorari.  In his judgment, however, it was not sufficiently clear that the opin-
ion had imposed procedural requirements.  He thus declined to file a petition
for certiorari, advising the Commission to conduct the proceedings on remand
without using any procedure it did not itself think justified and promising that if
the Commission were reversed again, his office might then think the matter
                                                          
9. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
10. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
11. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Bazelon, J., concurring); cf.
id. at 68 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
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ripe for the Court.  Since the private utilities involved were going to file a peti-
tion in any event, however, he agreed that his office’s responsive filing, al-
though filed in opposition to the granting of the writ, would both state the
Commission’s position in a footnote and indicate in the text that if the Court
thought his assessment erroneous—that is, if the Court concluded that the mat-
ter was ripe for decision—the United States supported the Commission’s view
on the merits.
II
COORDINATING THE LEGAL WORK OF GOVERNMENT
In each of the foregoing vignettes, government lawyers spoke to each other
across agency lines, seeking essentially collaborative ends.  Other issues are
presented by the occasional conflict between opposing agencies, whether in
formal litigation or in situations in which one agency falls under the general
regulatory jurisdiction of another.  In the world of the vignettes, cooperation
and service are, or at least one might think ought to be, the order of the day.
Yet, as these vignettes perhaps reveal, formidable obstacles may nonetheless
arise.
The very size of government is in itself an obstacle, diffusing responsibility
and fostering anonymity.  And, outside the arena of litigation, where the At-
torney General is generally in command, that inevitable effect is compounded
by the general absence of mechanisms for cooperation among the government’s
lawyers on issues of joint concern.12  Government lawyers function as attorneys
for the Department of Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or the
Department of Agriculture—or perhaps for smaller units of any one of those.
Any one of these offices may be of a size that, in the private world, converts the
ideal of partnership into a much more impersonal business.  In this environ-
ment, opportunities for meeting on common ground, identifying and working
out shared problems, are scarce.
Thus, the Administrative Conference of the United States, which once con-
stituted a kind of meeting ground for consideration of common issues of ad-
ministrative law, has disappeared.13  The Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs in OMB and the Vice President’s Office (notably the National Per-
formance Review) have provided, for some purposes, a common meeting
ground and forum for the resolution of inter-agency disputes.  The Office of
Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice provides formal advice in a relative
                                                          
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-519 (1994).  The Attorney General’s sway, even in the litigation context,
is limited by the possibility of statutory exceptions—common in the independent regulatory commis-
sion context, and not unknown even outside that setting, compare Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994)—and by the proposition that it is only litigation, and not as-
sociated agency decisionmaking, that she is entitled to control, see, for example, Hughes Aircraft v.
United States, 534 F.2d 889, 901 (Cl. Ct. 1976).
13. See Symposium, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (1998).
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handful of situations.14  The Federal Bar Association offers some possibilities
for voluntary association.  Yet the very enormity of the government’s lawyering
establishment works against inter-office communication not driven by a par-
ticular, relatively urgent controversy or other need.
Consider in this respect an issue common to all regulators: whether, to what
extent, and how information about regulatory requirements should be made
available on the Internet.  This represents a matter of some interest to govern-
ment attorneys (and the public that deals with them).  Recent years have wit-
nessed the exponential growth of the “information superhighway,” warmly em-
braced by the Clinton Administration.  The Paperwork Reduction Act of 199515
imposed on both OIRA (as coordinator) and on individual agencies responsi-
bilities, inter alia, for “enhancing public access to and dissemination of informa-
tion, using electronic and other formats.”16  Doing so would bring a welcome
improvement in the transparency of government, enhancing the accessibility of
information about regulatory requirements and interpretations.  In an era of
near universal generation of government documents by word-processing, it is
trivial to give electronic access to regulations, proposals for action, interpreta-
tions, and any other matter required by law to be available to the public.  Yet it
remains the case, almost three years later, that “the federal government’s web
sites are many, yet many seem constructed largely as tourist attractions, rather
than serious centers for information dispersal; few if any agencies yet make
rulemaking or its documents electronically accessible.”17  A visitor to those
sites, even for agencies located within the same department, often finds no evi-
dence that people have worked with one another to establish what material
should be available, much less a predictable format for discovering it.18  For ex-
ample, although all agency regulations published in the Code of Federal Regu-
lations and all Federal Register notices are in fact on line and fully searchable
through a Government Printing Office website, among other means,19 agency
                                                          
14. See 28 CFR § 0.25 (1997).  “Executive departments”—meaning the very top of the agency—
may request an opinion of the Attorney General, 28 U.S.C. § 512 (1994), but they are under no obliga-
tion to do so and, short of litigation, it appears that her view would not control.
15. Pub. L. No. 104-13, § 2, 109 Stat. 163 (1995) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3520 (Supp. II
1996)).
16. Id. at § 3505(a)(3)(B)(ii).
17. Teachers Manual for STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN’S & BYSE’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS (9th ed. 1995).
18. In the Department of Agriculture’s web site, for example, see United States Department of
Agriculture, Home Page (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.usda.gov>, the Agricultural Marketing
Service, Farm Service Agency, and Forest Service permit searching agency documents (using different
search engines), but give no direct access to agency regulations; the Food Safety and Inspection Serv-
ice, Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration, and rural development agencies pro-
vide their regulations but no search capacities; only the Forest Service appears to give access to mat-
ters currently open for public comment; only the Office of Departmental Administration appears to
give access to interpretive advisories; and so forth.  See United States Agriculture Department, Agen-
cies and Staff Offices (visited Oct. 12, 1998) <http://www.usda.gov/agencies/agencies.htm>.
19. See National Archives and Records Administration, Code of Federal Regulations, (last modi-
fied Aug. 4, 1998) <http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/index.html>.  The Government Printing Office
search page, see Government Printing Office, Connect to Databases Online Via GPO Access (last
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web pages do not point in that direction.  This failure strikingly reflects this ab-
sence of coordinative imagination and effort.
Consider also the developments in administrative law, relevant to all regula-
tors and the subject of important legislative initiatives for the past several
years.  Each agency encounters its issues—how to conduct rulemakings, adjudi-
cations, and other elements of its affairs—in the context of its own responsibili-
ties.  The government lawyer does not spontaneously learn what is going on in
other agencies or the outcome of judicial review of the proceedings that might
affect the affairs of her own agency.  When important issues arise in a litigation
context, even in the Supreme Court, it is possible, but in my experience rare,
that the Department of Justice will consult broadly on their possible implica-
tions.  If legislation is proposed, the OMB will seek her agency’s view, but that
is a rather hierarchical process, with no assurance of participation in discussions
or influence on the final shape of testimony.20  In either event, her agency’s
limited resources will often constrain the effectiveness of its participation.  Of
course, the government lawyer reads—within the time constraints of her formal
responsibilities and the scope of her agency’s library budget.  Perhaps she will
be sent, as I was, to conferences run by the Brookings Institution or similar
service providers who staff a variety of government “continuing education”
programs.  On her own time, she may participate in bar association considera-
tion of general legal issues, albeit without government subvention and under
conflict of interest rules that limit the bar’s capacity to relieve her of expenses
private law firms generally subsidize.  Until two years ago, her agency’s general
counsel would have been a member of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, whose small permanent staff, slender research budget, and bien-
nial meetings identified common problems and provided occasional fora for
their discussion.  The Conference’s $1.5 million annual budget was sacrificed to
deficit reduction by a Congress perhaps happy enough to diminish the oppor-
tunities bureaucrats had to learn from one another.  White House substitutes,
bruited about from time to time, have not securely emerged.  As my experience
was then, I suspect it is still:  Isolation is a predominant experience of the gov-
ernment attorney, perhaps especially within the independent regulatory com-
missions.
A dramatic, if poignant, example of this isolation appears in the literature,
in relation to the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).  That agency no-
toriously made no significant use of rulemaking for policy development
through the 1980s.  While occasionally using rulemaking to develop procedural
                                                          
modified Aug. 7, 1998) <http://www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aaces002.html>, also permits one to
specify searches of the annual Unified Agenda of federal regulatory activity.
20. For example, in recent congressional testimony about general regulatory reform proposals I
have had the opportunity to attend, the EPA has consistently been present, but not representatives of
old-line regulatory departments (Interior, Agriculture, Labor, HHS) or independent agencies (SEC,
NRC, FTC).  Of course, the EPA had very high stakes in the issues being discussed, and the absence of
others from the witness table did not prove their absence from the process by which administration
testimony was prepared.  They, too, however, had high stakes in these matters, and the EPA’s interests
may have been quite different from their own in important respects.
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rules, it developed its substantive labor policy almost exclusively through case-
by-case administration.  Unsurprisingly, as rulemaking came to be the pre-
ferred means for general policy development, the NLRB became embroiled in
litigation over its reticence to use it.21  Professor Mark Grunewald has chroni-
cled the NLRB’s subsequent, hesitant exploration of the rulemaking proce-
dure.22  The Government in the Sunshine Act23 enabled him to give us tran-
scripts of relevant Board discussions; those discussions suggest not only a
considerable level of naivete about the rulemaking procedures the Board was
exploring but—as striking for these purposes—no evidence of consultation out-
side the agency for “expert help” in establishing a procedure whose dimen-
sions, by this time, were well-known.24  The NLRB’s Notice of Proposed Rule-
making25 reflects awareness of the controversy over its own rulemaking much
more than awareness of the general literature on the subject or general agency
experience in implementing it.  Without evident discussion,26 the Board chose a
hybrid form of procedure whose tendencies to produce complexity had been
noted in other settings.27  The Board’s encounter with rulemaking in this man-
ner appears to have been definitive; it seems hardly to have tried it again.28
It is unlikely that we will see the size of either government or its legal es-
tablishment shrink significantly.  That ought to underscore the need for cen-
tripetal institutions, as the Administrative Conference formerly was, through
which problems can be shared across agency lines.  Yet, in the tensions pro-
duced by efforts to balance the budget while still achieving government’s ends,
resources for coordination and interchange may easily seem the most expend-
able.  The Vice President’s office and OIRA, steadily emerging in the last sev-
eral administrations as the political and technocratic managers, respectively, of
                                                          
21. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759 (1969); cf. American Hosp. Ass’n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991) (denying a challenge to the
NLRB’s decision to use its broad rulemaking powers).
22. See Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 1991
DUKE L.J. 274.  To date, the rule involved in Grunewald’s article, 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1998), also ap-
pears to have been the NLRB’s last rulemaking.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994).
24. STRAUSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 432-34.
25. Collective Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987).
26. See id. at 25,148.
27. See generally Barry B. Boyer, Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade
Commission, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.: RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS
41 (1979); Barry B. Boyer, Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission
(Phase II), in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.: RECOMMENDATIONS  & REPORTS
33 (1980).
28. No other similar rule appears in Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations.  The two most
recent Unified Agendas of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, see 62 Fed. Reg. 22,716
(1997); id. at 58,468 (1997), reveal that in 1994 the Board began consideration of a rule that might have
limited litigation over the appropriateness of petitioned-for single-unit bargaining units, see Appropri-
ateness of Requested Single Location Bargaining Units in Representation Cases, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,501
(1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 50,146 (1995), but that further action on that proposal has been blocked by ap-
propriation riders forbidding the expenditure of funds on the proceeding.  All other items listed—four
in April, two in October—were procedural in character.  The FTC, by way of contrast, listed more than
20 rulemakings pending in each of those agendas, the great proportion of them substantive in charac-
ter.
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day-to-day domestic government, perhaps could serve to build government’s
cohesion—to serve, as it were, as hubs of the wheels of regulation.  Yet, their
very authority can also work against their success.  The exercise of their politi-
cal or legal authority to issue commands to the agencies that work with them
can convert general concerns for governmental operation into struggles over
particular outcomes—the more immediate, the more easily identified, appar-
ently the more worthy of effort and expenditure in the short run—and that in
itself can undercut the coordinative impulse.  Building institutions that are
genuinely consultative, and that merit the expenditure of resources on all sides,
would prove no small task.
III
THE RELATION OF INDEPENDENT AGENCIES AND THE PRESIDENT
One regular aspect of the General Counsel’s work at the Commission was
preparing correspondence with the White House concerning legislative propos-
als, both the Commission’s own and those sought by other agencies on which
OMB sought the Commission’s views.  The OMB’s circular on legislative coor-
dination and clearance sets exacting requirements for internal consultations in
the Executive Branch before virtually any conversation with Congress, whether
it concerns the submission of proposed legislation, reports, or hearing testi-
mony.29  The circular gives “agency” a sweeping definition, explicitly embracing
the independent regulatory commissions, yet accepting that Congress will
sometimes have sought to limit their cooperation with White House processes.30
Internally, it could not have been clearer that the NRC’s Commissioners
valued these consultations.  Whatever might have been their legal right to pro-
ceed on their own, both their sense of the “teamwork” appropriate to govern-
ment and their knowledge of the benefits that OMB goodwill might bring mo-
tivated them to cooperate with these processes.  They expended efforts on
these communications commensurate with what they gave to Congress (and
rather more than on communications with the courts, where the General Coun-
sel was generally left to his own devices), and were willing to risk congressional
disfavor by delaying response or cooperation pending OMB’s advice.  Particu-
larly if one felt that this was not a matter of legal obligation, it could be frus-
                                                          
29. See Legislative Coordination and Clearance, OMB CIRCULAR A-19 (Sept. 29, 1979)  <http://
www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/OMB/html/circulars/a019/a019.html>.
30.  The Circular provides the following:
4. COVERAGE.  All executive branch agencies (as defined in section 5b) are subject to the
provisions of this Circular, except those agencies that are specifically required by law to
transmit their legislative proposals, reports, or testimony to the Congress without prior clear-
ance.  OMB will, however, honor requests from such agencies for advice on the relationship
of particular legislation, reports, or testimony to the program of the President.
5. DEFINITIONS.  For the purpose of this Circular, the following definitions apply: . . .
 b. AGENCY.  Any executive department or independent commission, board, bureau, office,
agency, Government-owned or controlled corporation, or other establishment of the Gov-
ernment, including any regulatory commission or board.
Id.
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trating to be under instructions to delay putting forward requested advice,
whose influence might thereby be diminished.  Yet it was easy to grasp the im-
pulses underlying the Commission’s preference:  Congress was not, after all, en-
titled to abstract the agency completely from the one elected head of executive
government; coordination of agency actions was desirable both to encourage
initiatives consistent with the President’s program and to identify, if not dis-
courage, those that were not.  Congress might structure the Commission’s rela-
tionship with the President, but it could not deny it one.
More striking were the attitudes suggested by the second opening vi-
gnette—encountered as strongly in the office of the President’s lawyer as in
conversations with lawyers at other independent agencies—that in fact the
Commission had no proper relation with the Executive Branch.  Perhaps this
was largely the product of realpolitik, a White House conclusion that fighting
with Congress over legal dominion was not important enough for the political
costs of taking that position.  In the series of executive orders leading up to the
current Executive Order 12,866 (requiring economic impact analyses in connec-
tion with important rulemakings), the White House has explicitly declined to
involve the independent regulatory commissions, although acknowledging legal
opinions that it has the authority to do so.31  If so, the politics may be changing.
Congress, once reflexively protective of the independents, seems to be ac-
knowledging the utility of central oversight and coordination, at least as to
some issues.  The Paperwork Reduction Act reserves a role for OIRA in rela-
tion to them, as to executive agencies, albeit under somewhat modified condi-
tions;32 the Regulatory Flexibility Act33 and more recent drafts of rulemaking
reform legislation providing for executive oversight of rulemaking do not dif-
ferentiate between independent and departmental agencies.  No one doubts
Congress’s authority thus to involve the President; what seemed the President’s
lawyers’ easy acceptance of its authority to exclude him is what prompted my
wonder, and a good deal of my subsequent writing.34
Two decades later, separation of powers law has evolved in ways that make
incredible any contemporary assertion by the Office of Legal Counsel that in-
dependent agencies cannot find shelter under the President’s wing.  This must
be a primary lesson of Freytag v. Commissioner,35 which so sharply delimited
the range of persons Congress could empower to make appointments of
“Officers of the United States,” within the meaning of the Constitution’s ap-
pointments clause.36  “Any appointee exercising significant authority pursuant
to the laws of the United States,” the Freytag Court said, must receive her
                                                          
31. See Peter L. Strauss & Cass Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rule-
making, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 202 (1986).
32. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (Supp. II 1996).
33. 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994).
34. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 2.
35. 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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commission from the President (with or without Senatorial assent), one of the
Heads of Departments, or the courts.37
Where does that leave appointment as General Counsel of the NRC?  My
commission was signed by the NRC’s Commissioners, not the President.  The
NRC is surely not a “court.”  Its general counsel is surely an “Officer of the
United States,” given the Court’s capacious description (and Congress’s desig-
nation of the post as worthy of executive-level compensation).  If lawfully ap-
pointed, then, it must be because I owed my commission to Article II “Heads
of Departments.”  Actually, the majority opinion in Freytag renders even this
conclusion dubious; it goes on at regrettable (and in my judgment unnecessary)
length about how a “Department” can only be a part or division of executive
government expressly created and given the name Department, citing a cen-
tury-old case that had no need to decide any so sweeping a proposition.38  It
would be hard to bring the NRC (or even the undeniably executive branch
EPA) under that umbrella.  But even if one took a broader view of who were
“Heads of Departments” (as Justice Scalia, concurring in Freytag, believed one
must39), that very conclusion puts the NRC in Article II, within reach, for ex-
ample, of the President’s authority to demand “the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the Executive Departments, upon any subject re-
lating to the Duties of their respective Offices”40—and hence, under the Presi-
dent’s wing, and within the protection (such as it is these days) of executive
privilege.
From the general perspective of being a government lawyer, however, per-
haps the most striking characteristic is how undeveloped the “law” is on such
central organizational issues.  For my office, feeling its way through relations
with the Department of State (much less the White House) presented chal-
lenges of constant improvisation with few guideposts, however high the stakes.
Used to imagining behemoth, anthropomorphized government—certainly, the
anthropomorphized agency—one’s constant experience from the inside was of
barely coordinated chaos.  Few lawyers will be surprised, perhaps, how often
seat-of-the-pants judgment is one’s principal professional tool; or that the in-
ternal experience of a seemingly huge and seamless bureaucracy is of diffuse
and uncoordinated authority.  Nonetheless, the room for difference, for uncer-
tainty about true fundamentals, for petty autocracy—and, yes, also for initiative
and responsibility—never ceased to astound.
IV
GOVERNMENT LITIGATION
The preference for rulemaking over adjudication as an instrument of agency
policy formulation carries with it the implication that litigation is not a par-
                                                          
37. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
38. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879).
39. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 918 (Scalia, J., concurring).
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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ticularly good policymaking tool.  While the notion that an agency will be able
rationally to choose between them in particular circumstances is a polite fiction,
and adjudication may offer more scope for initiative to the particular players
who are responsible for initiating and conducting it,41 agency litigators are
rarely the individuals given principal operating responsibility for agency policy
formation and implementation.  Nor do they often have a broad and compre-
hensive view of agency function and needs.  Litigation processes produce views
of the issues involved that are notoriously dependent on particular (and likely
atypical) facts; and they are highly dependent on individual rather than collec-
tive effort.  All of these distortions can be more pronounced when the litigator
works outside the responsible agency.
As an independent regulatory commission, the NRC had more control over
its litigation, for better or worse, than would a cabinet department.  In general,
its own lawyers appeared on its behalf and controlled its filings.  The world of
litigation was where the lawyers came into their own.  No other players within
the agency purported “expertise” in this field.  The Commissioners themselves,
not lawyers save one, depended uniquely upon their lawyers for advice.
In the peculiar structure of the NRC, that left a certain amount of room for
competition.  Its small General Counsel’s Office advised the Commissioners
themselves, prepared their opinion, legislative testimony, and correspondence
with OMB, and represented the Commission in court.  The larger office of the
Executive Legal Director represented its staff of about 2,000, presented the
agency’s side at administrative hearings, conducted its rulemakings, and drew
up its contracts.  The two offices occasionally struggled over what fell in whose
camp or whose view of legal consequences was the sounder.  Probably these
struggles enlarged the Commissioners’ operative freedom of action, by making
apparent the availability of choices a unified legal office might not have identi-
fied.
Yet, the largest risk was the one created both by lawyers’ unique domain
over and expertise in litigation, and by the arguable distortions that concern
over litigation occasioned in their judgment.  The risk was that the two offices
would make common cause against other offices in the Commission, enlarging
lawyers’ domains at the expense of others’, by flaunting the banner of adverse
“litigation consequences” as reasons why their judgment ought to carry special
weight.  Doing so, after all, was a way to make one’s voice distinctively heard.
In fact, it was not litigation, but planning and counseling that made life in the
General Counsel’s office particularly distinctive and rewarding.  One was
shaping the future, charting events whose outlines could be only dimly grasped.
In these settings, though, whether preparing for legislative testimony or helping
the NRC understand its options in evaluating and pursuing a desired course of
action, the work of the office was not unique.  Other agency offices, both re-
                                                          
41. See Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Depart-
ment: Reflections on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
1231 (1974).
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sponsible bureaus and competitor staff offices like the Office of Policy Plan-
ning, were equally present at the table and attempting to have their say.  Jeal-
ousies about what was for lawyers, and what for engineers, often surfaced.  Bu-
reaucratic politics was frequently the mode of operation.  “Litigation conse-
quences” was—and is—a tempting weapon in the lawyer’s arsenal.
How “litigation consequences” can drive agency behaviors is a clearly
marked hazard of agency life, a hazard that underlies much of the current de-
bate about the ossification of rulemaking.  Controlling its use as an argument
on policy issues inside the NRC might be thought to be a problem similar to
that faced by any private attorney in relationship to her client:  A large part of
professional responsibility is preserving client autonomy, and in this context
that means raising the “litigation consequences” argument only with great cau-
tion.  Concern to control the argument’s use animated much of my office’s
dealings with the Commissioners and, especially, with the separate Office of
the Executive Legal Director.
Even more striking, however, were the ways in which external litigators and
litigation, lacking any obligation or likelihood of loyalty to the Commission’s
agenda, drove agency business.  The efforts of adversaries in this respect war-
rant no special attention; that litigation is among the tools “public interest” liti-
gators and others use to attempt to control agency priorities is commonplace,
and threshold doctrines such as standing and ripeness recognize and seek, to a
degree, to control the risk.  Here it seems more useful to turn to the complica-
tions introduced by having outside counsel for one’s own case.
The Department of Justice works much harder to control government ap-
peals from adverse trial judgments than it does the initiation of litigation in the
first place.42  Perhaps one should understand this choice in terms of the re-
sources that might be required, and of the differing systemic implications for
the government as a whole of controlling trial actions rather than simply vetting
appeals.  The first of the vignettes sketched in the opening pages of this essay,
the Brookhaven waste litigation, was nonetheless a sharp lesson in the resulting
possibility of governmental chaos.  However the impulse to litigation had been
created, early discussions among lawyers for the agencies concerned—the NRC
and the Departments of Energy and Transportation—quickly developed an
understanding that the problem could be dealt with proactively under the new
but not yet effective procedures made possible by the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act of 1994.43
But none of these lawyers was in charge of the litigation.  The young Assis-
tant U.S. Attorney from the Southern District of New York had the United
                                                          
42. No appeal from adverse action in the district court or petition for rehearing en banc in the
courts of appeal may be filed without the permission of the Solicitor General, a process that can be as
extended as securing his approval for the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court, when an agency has lost its case in one of the courts of appeal.  No similar coordinating process
or constraint governs the initiation of litigation.
43. Pub. L. No. 103-311, title I, 108 Stat. 1673 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27 (1994
& Supp. II 1996)).
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States as his client, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District as his senior
partner, and the Attorney General as no more than a remote adviser in distant
Washington, D.C.  Whatever the formal legal authority of the Attorney Gen-
eral over a U.S. Attorney, the political situation is one of limited control.
Those officers, too, are presidential nominees, confirmed by the Senate and of-
ten important to the Senators of their districts.  Over the years, the office in the
Southern District of New York, in particular, had acquired a practical inde-
pendence of Justice Department direction.  That independence occasionally
raised eyebrows or caused knowing smiles in Washington, but the real gesture
was the defeated shrug that accompanied it:  What, after all, was it possible to
do?  The Attorney General would not, could not, micro-manage work in the of-
fices of U.S. Attorneys.  The litigation would and did go forward.
The appellate process was much more tightly controlled.  Yet, even here,
outside lawyers responsible solely for litigation may have difficulty under-
standing the consequences of their actions for agency behavior.  This difficulty
marked the Commission’s relationships with the Department of Justice, in par-
ticular with the Office of the Solicitor General.  Serving as an attorney in that
office at an earlier point in my career,  I had understood the contributions it
made to government overall: promoting its interests in the Supreme Court by
screening government litigation for importance, maturity, and equitable appeal,
and counterbalancing the tunnel-vision of particular agencies with a broader
view of the government’s litigation exposures and needs.  What had not been as
evident then was the peculiar tunnel-vision that the habit of dealing always with
litigation can occasion.
By statute and with the Court’s blessing, the Solicitor General controls ac-
cess to the Court for the independent regulatory commissions as well as cabinet
departments.44  The Supreme Court is, doubtless, well-served by a single office
responsible for screening litigation and for expressing the views of “the United
States.”  The independence of an NRC finds expression, perhaps, in a greater
willingness to convey the views of the agency as well as those of the office,
where they differ.  In the end, that willingness served the Commission well.  On
three occasions during my time as general counsel, the Commission sought the
Solicitor General’s permission to file a petition for certiorari.  On each occa-
sion, we came away without permission to do that, but because the private util-
ity filed a petition, the government was obliged to respond.  In that response,
the Commission’s fears as well as the Solicitor General’s views could be and
were put before the Court.  Each of these cases resulted in Court action in the
Commission’s favor.  Perhaps we were simply failing to be as persuasive as we
should have been to that Office, in so consistently failing to gain its adherence
to views that ultimately prevailed.
                                                          
44. See Federal Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96-97 (1994), see
generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent
Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994).
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Yet the third vignette above, the run-up to Vermont Yankee, may suggest
that at least part of the explanation lies in how the Office of the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s litigation perspective distorted its view.  What the Commission sought,
after all, was not procedural ease but effective, lawful action.  Why should it
experiment with a risky procedural course—it had taken four years to get from
the initiation of rulemaking to the first D.C. Circuit opinion—when it knew
how to achieve a result that would prove procedurally acceptable, albeit more
expensive to reach?  The idea that it would take the risks involved in securing a
procedurally well-framed case, rather than act to get its business securely done,
marked a kind of disconnect between litigation and programmatic responsibili-
ties that was eye-opening at the time, and has remained so since.45  The Solici-
tor General’s advice, in effect, provided exactly the litigation-avoidance incen-
tives that drive ostensibly voluntary procedural complexity.  From the agency
perspective, present efficiency gains are easily overcome by the risk that one
might learn, years after the fact, that secondary errors have undercut the valid-
ity of primary effort.  That is the direction in which “litigation consequences”
invariably push.
Was the Solicitor General wrong to worry about the concreteness of the
case as presented, the clarity with which the issue the Commission wished to
raise was presented on its facts?  The relevance of the question is hard to deny,
both as a matter of risk to broader government interests should the effort to es-
tablish a favorable rule of law backfire and as a prudential matter of preserving
his office’s reputation as a protector of the Court’s gates.  As the government’s
lawyer in that forum, he will disserve its interests if seen too easily to accede to
agency importunings.  In a way, the presentation format he chose permitted the
government to have its cake and eat it too:  The NRC position was fully articu-
lated, and by voicing his own office’s concern about ripeness, he demonstrated
to the Court in a very practical way that he was aware of and serving a protec-
tive function that might protect its interests.
Yet, one is also left with the conviction that the litigation lens was in fact
distorting.  His advice to “try again, to see if you get a clearer statement” would
have imposed on the agency the very harm from which it was seeking to be
free.  And it reflects a failure of understanding easily connected with his re-
sponsibility only for litigation and not for the success of an agency’s substantive
program.  From that perspective, one can understand the wish for a sharper,
cleaner case, but the idea that that would be the agency’s interest, rather than a
successful promulgation of its rule, is surely naive.  The litigation tail, once
again, is wagging too vigorously, at significant risk to the policy dog.
                                                          
45. Compare United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 230-34 (1973), where the recita-
tion of facts makes plain what extraordinary political pressure was required to make the Interstate
Commerce Commission choose the risks and speed of procedural efficiency over the costs and delays
of procedural certainty.
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V
CONCLUSION
Who is the government lawyer’s client is, indeed, a complex question.  The
adage inscribed on the Justice Department, that the government wins its case in
court whenever justice is done, reflects an ambiguity about client loyalty that
infects even the most direct of representations.  It is, at the same time, a check
on public power—no “good soldier” defense will be recognized here—and an
invitation to the exercise of personal will.  It can be very hard to tell the differ-
ence, particularly where the nature of the client is also diffuse.  Thus, the diffi-
culties are enlarged by the unsettled character of structural issues within the
Executive Branch.  Limited domains of hierarchy, limited capacities to secure
uniformity, limited settings in which it is even sought—all these conjoin, also, to
produce an ambiguity about obligation, within which the individual govern-
ment lawyer may find considerable room for maneuver.  And finally, as per-
haps in any very large organization, specialization of lawyerly function can pro-
duce its own distortions.  The litigator’s imagined client may be quite other
than the planner/counselor’s.  The two cannot be brought together; it will be
rare that a single voice will be heard.  In the end, as Francis Lieber remarked in
a quite different context, “somewhere we needs must trust at last to common
sense and good faith.”46
                                                          
46. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 30-31 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein eds., 1970) (1839).
